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 Abstract 
The rate of new household formation among young adults who live with their parents has 
decreased in the last twenty years, specially in Southern Europe. At the same time, exposure 
to the risk that a young adult loses his or her job has increased. We use differences in firing 
costs across contract types in the Spanish labor market to identify if there is a causal link 
between both developments. Our first identification strategy exploits a legally-induced sharp 
increase in firing costs 3 years after the starting of a fixed-term contract between 1987 and 
1996. The second uses variation in regional incentives to promote high-firing cost contracts 
between 1997 and 2001. Both strategies fail to detect a causal impact of job insecurity on 
the probability of forming a new household. Tentative evidence supports the notion that 
lower job insecurity has an impact on the form of tenure of the first house of residence, 
favoring home-ownership over renting. 
JEL Codes: J1, J2. 
Keywords: Job security, household formation. 
 
 
 
There are large country differences in the rate of household formation among
young adults, leading to very different household structure. While among Scan-
dinavian and Anglo Saxon countries, the fraction of adults between 18 and 35
years of age who live with their parents is below 50%, the corresponding fraction
in Southern Europe is about 70%. Italy (74% of young adults live with their
parents), Greece (70%) and Spain (67%) are examples of countries with very
high coresidency rates; the Netherlands (20%), the United Kingdom (21%) and
Ireland (22%) fall in the opposite extreme of the spectrum -see Becker, Ben-
tolila, Fernandes and Ichino (2007b). This paper investigates whether or not
exposure to the risk of losing the job explains differences in household formation
of Southern European young adults.
The pattern of household formation of young adults has important conse-
quences both for resource allocation in an economy and for the effectiveness of
public policy aimed at redistributing income between generations. First, liv-
ing with parents confines young adults to focus their job search in a limited
geographical area, thus limiting the possibilities of finding a good match at a
point of the life-cycle where workers are typically most mobile (Neal, 1999).
Second, the decision to form a household and to have a child tend are lumped
in Southern Europe (Billari et al., 2001). Understanding the determinants of
household formation helps us to understand the recent stark drop in fertility
rates in Southern Europe. Third, high rates of coresidency put into question
who benefits from public programs, like Social Security, that redistribute in-
come from the young to the elderly. The reason is that young adults living with
their parents potentially share consumption of housing and food costs. Under
such implicit resource sharing, intergenerational redistribution from young to
elderly may not be effective because any euro that a young adult passes on the
elder member through public redistribution may be given back through private
resource sharing. Fourth, understanding whether young adults react to income
risks by delaying household formation helps us to assess how vulnerable workers
cope with the risk of falling into poverty (McGarry and Haider, 2005).1
1Recent research has tried to address the question: why do young adults in some countries
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A widespread explanation of the incidence of coresidency between young
adults and their parents is the increase of job insecurity faced by young adults.
Becker et al. (2007a) present a theoretical model predicting that, under certain
conditions, coresidency rates are positively related to employment risk faced by
young adults and are negatively related to the employment risk of their parents.
More generally, economic theory predicts that the presence of uncertainty about
a future income stream tends to delay hard to reverse decisions with respect to
a situation of perfect certainty. Unfortunately, the evidence of the literature
that examines the link between employment risk and household formation does
not deliver clear-cut conclusions. Gutierrez-Doménech (2005) and De la Rica
and Iza (2004) use the European Community Household Panel to document
that variation in firing costs due to changes in the type of contract makes young
females more likely to form a new household and to become mothers. Ruiz-
Castillo and Martínez-Granado (2002) document that unemployment rates are
positively related with rates of cohabitation. Becker et al. (2007b) find that
parental job insecurity has an stronger effect on young adult’s household forma-
tion than youth’s exposure to the risk of losing a job. Several reasons account
for the discrepancy of results in the literature. First, it is generally hard to
find good measures of employment risk. Second, even when good measures of
employment risk are available, it is difficult to find variation in exposure to
employment risk that is uncorrelated with other variables that correlate with
household formation.
This study re-examines the link between obtaining a job with a low prob-
ability of transiting into unemployment and the decision of establishing a new
household focusing on what we consider are better measures of employment
risk and plausibly exogenous changes in job security. Our contribution is to
use the explosion of fixed-term contracts to identify jobs with high probability
stay so long with their parents. Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1994) support the notion that
low-income children are more likely to live with parents (holding parental income constant).
Manacorda and Moretti (2006) document that parents with higher income levels are more
likely to live with their children, consistent with the predictions of an exchange model of the
extended family. Giuliano (2007) studies the role of culture in household formation. Martins
and Villanueva (2006) study the impact of borrowing costs on household formation.
3
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of transition into unemployment. Workers with jobs regulated by a fixed-term
(temporary) contract face a much higher probability of transiting into unem-
ployment than workers with jobs regulated by a “permanent” (high firing cost)
contract.2 The reason is that firms pay higher firing costs upon unilateral termi-
nation of the second type of job than for the first (between 33 and 45 wage days
per year worked vs almost termination at will if the firm does not renew the
temporary contract). Second, we use two different identification strategies that
exploit arguably exogenous changes in firing costs and that allow us to examine
the link between employment risk and living arrangements of the youth.
The first strategy identifies possibly exogenous variation in contract changes
associated to legal limits in the time a worker could be fired by a firm using a
fixed-term contract. Between 1984 and 1994, firms could only employ a worker
and regulate the employment relationship with a fixed-term contract (contrato
de fomento del empleo) for a period of time that could not exceed 3 years. Three
years after signing the first fixed-term contract, the firm was legally obliged to
either dismiss the worker or to convert the contract into a permanent one (i.e.,
high-firing cost one). Building on the ideas and methods of Güell and Petrongolo
(2007), we provide evidence that the three-year-limit is binding. Like Güell and
Petrongolo, we document a peak in the rate of conversion of contracts into
permanent ones three-years after the signing of a contract. Thus, we use the
3-year discontinuity as an instrument for contract conversion. Our strategy is
then to examine the evolution of household formation by young adults in the
proximity of the period in which the mandatory contract change is due. Changes
around mandatory conversion of contracts have the advantage of being induced
by legal changes, and less by other confounding factors (more active local labor
markets, promotions of better workers) that also signal higher lifetime income
prospects and also affect the chances of youth emancipation.
The second strategy exploits variation across Spanish regions in the intro-
duction and amount of subsidies to firms to convert temporary contracts into
2 Italy, Portugal, France and Spain are countries where fixed-term contracts have been
widely used. Spain is, by far, the country with a most important share of such contracts. See
Dolado et al. (2002).
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permanent ones. Those incentives were introduced in 1997 by different regional
authorities as a response of growing rates of temporary jobs. Not all regional
governments decided to implement them (right-wing regional governments were
less likely to do so), and among those regional governments that decided to
give subsidies to conversion, the amount of the subsidy varied among different
demographic groups. Using the 1997-2001 waves of the Spanish Employment
Survey (EPA) we construct a sample of young adults first observed living with
their parents and working with a fixed-term contract. We first document that
the mean subsidy in the region (holding regional characteristics constant) was
positively related with the rate of conversion of fixed-term contracts into perma-
nent ones.3 We then relate the decision of starting a new household to changes
in the type of contract, instrumenting the change in the type of contract with
the mean subsidy in the region.
Overall, our results suggest that employment risk is an unlikely explanation
of the international differences in the living arrangements of young adults. The
paper is organized as follows. Section 1 provides some background on the Span-
ish labor market and on living arrangements. Section 2 describes our empirical
strategies and Section 3 our data. Section 4 presents the empirical results and
Section 5 concludes.
1 Fixed-term contracts and living arrangements
1.1 Living arrangements and fixed-term contracts
Differences in living arrangements between Southern and Northern Europe have
been present for several decades (Billari et al., 2001) and seem to persist even
among second-generation migrants in the US (Giuliano, 2007). Yet, as Bentolila
et al. (2007) discuss, cross-country differences in the rate of household forma-
tion have widened since the mid 80s. For example, and focusing on the Spanish
case, Graph 1a displays the evolution of the fraction of Spanish adults between
16 and 35 years of age who lived with their parents between 1987 and 2001.
3Rebollo and García-Pérez (2007) study the impact of the amout of the subsidy on worker
flows using administrative data and document similar findings.
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The graph suggests a steady increase from 56% in 1987 until 64% in the early
nineties. Graph 1b shows the incidence of a particular type of job contract with
very low firing costs: fixed-term contracts. The resemblance between Graphs 1a
and 1b, together with the basic prediction of economic theory that in the pres-
ence of increased risk of losing the job, consumers tend to delay hard-to-reverse
decisions, invite investigation of the link between exposure to employment loss
and delay in the formation of a new household. Before doing that, we briefly
review the salient characteristics of fixed-term contracts (see Dolado et al., 2002
or Güell and Petrongolo 2007, for a more in-depth analysis).
1.2 Fixed term contracts: legal framework
Fixed term contracts were introduced in various European countries as a way
of introducing flexibility-at the margin in labor markets with severe firing costs.
That is, contracts with lower firing costs were introduced only for entrants into
new contracts while not changing firing costs of existing contracts. Spain was
the European country with a strongest prevalence of such fixed-term contracts.
In that sense, Spain provides a laboratory to examine the consequences of high
exposure to the risk of losing the job. The reform in 1984 operated through the
extension to any type of contractual relationship of a contractual figure originally
thought for seasonal workers. Those contracts featured very low indemnities at
termination. Table A.2 summarizes the legal changes with the minimum and
maximum periods of duration of temporary contract between 1984 and 1995.
During that period, the maximum probation period using a temporary contract
was 3 years. After the third year, the firm could choose between finishing
the relationship with the worker or signing a high-firing cost (“permanent”)
contract.
In 1997 a national-wide reform reduced the cost of firing permanent workers
(from 45 wage-days per year worked to 33 wage-days).4 At the same time, some
of the 17 regional authorities decided to subsidize firms who signed permanent
contracts, possibly in response to the growing incidence of fixed-term contracts
4Kugler et al. (2005) provide more detail on the legal implications of the reform.
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among vulnerable workers - see García-Pérez and Rebollo (2007), who also ex-
amine the impact of those subsidies on labor market flows. Subsidies to contract
conversion were typically lump-sum amounts given to firms that proved that a
new permanent contract was signed (either by an existing worker whose job was
regulated by a fixed-term contract or by a new worker who was unemployed).
In some cases, the subsidies took the form of a reduction in the payroll tax .
Table A.1, taken from Garcia and Rebollo (2007) shows the subsidies by region
and demographic group. Table A.1 also documents that the size of subsidies
varied over time (for example, Galicia removed them in 1998), and also among
demographic groups; Andalucia had special subsidies for firms who changed the
contract of workers below 30 years of age into a temporary one, and some re-
gions had higher subsidies for females (Valencia, Cantabria and Navarra, for
example).
1.3 Are fixed term contracts a good proxy for employment
risk?
Workers hired under a fixed-term contracts were much more likely to experi-
ence a transition to non-employment than comparable workers hired under a
permanent contract. Own computations from the Spanish Employment Survey
suggest that employment risk does vary substantially between both types of
workers; while workers covered by a fixed-term contract faced a probability of
transiting into unemployment of about 12% in a given quarter, the correspond-
ing probability for a worker covered by a permanent contract was about 3%.5 A
pertinent question is whether or not workers covered under a fixed-term contract
actually perceive a higher chance of transiting into unemployment than workers
covered by a permanent contract. For example, workers whose job is covered
by a permanent contract may perceive that if they lose their job, there are few
chances of finding a comparable one, because most exits from unemployment
typically happen through fixed-term contracts (see Bover and Gomez, 2004).
5Regressions of the probability of transiting into unemployment on an indicator of Fixed-
Term contract and age, occupation and industry dummies deliver similar results.
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Alternatively, one may claim that some workers may be covered by a fixed-term
contract, but see little chances of being in unemployment, due to strong local
demand for their skills. While the Spanish EPA has little information about
worker’s perception of job insecurity, we have done an out-of-sample experi-
ment to examine if subjective perceptions are affected by the type of contract.
The European Community Household Panel contains some information about
the worker’s satisfaction with job insecurity. Below, we report some sugges-
tive evidence suggesting that subjective satisfaction with insecurity on the job
experiences a peak when a fixed-term contract is upgraded to a permanent one.
2 The identification strategy
The correlation between contract type and household formation is confounded
by several omitted concurrent factors, summarized in a footnote.6 Thus, our
study exploits variation in contract type that is weakly correlated with either
the ability of the worker or the local labor market. We discuss each source of
exogenous variation in contract type below.
2.1 First strategy: Exploiting legal time limits
Our first strategy exploits the discontinuity a legally-induced change of proba-
bility of obtaining a permanent contract three years after signing a temporary
contract.7 Our basic assumption is that as time progresses in a job, information
6Unobserved factors (both economic and non-economic) are correlated both with the
propensity to form a new household and with the conversion of a temporary contract into
a permanent one. Among others, more mature young adults may have a higher taste for
independency and be more committed to the labor market, making the firm more likely to be
willing to promote the worker with a permanent contract. A simple regression of an indica-
tor of living with parents and type of contract will confound the impact of employment risk
with workers’ maturity. Second, in a context of limited worker mobility, young adults may
face different local labor markets (Topel, 1986) . Young adults in better local labor markets
may face higher probabilities of being promoted, if they are a relatively more scarce resource,
and for the same reason, may expect higher future earnings, leading them to establish a new
household.
7As mentioned in the 1984 Worker’s Act, no worker could work for the same firm for more
than three years with a fixed-term contract. Of course, large firms could avoid such regulations
by using legal loopholes, like transferring workers covered by a fixed-term contract to other
firms of the group when the three-year limit binds. All we need for our instrument to work
(i.e., to predict contract changes) is that transferring workers within the same firm carries
a cost that makes it more likely for firms to upgrade the contract. Loss of position-specific
8
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about the worker, experience and outside options accumulate in a continuous
fashion. A young worker who has been working for a firm for two years and
eleven months has revealed virtually the same kind of information to the mar-
ket as a young worker that has been working in his or her position for three
years and one month. Nevertheless, in terms of job security, there is an un-
ambiguous mean increase. At three years, firms have an incentive to convert
some contracts into high firing cost ones if they want to retain workers.8 Thus,
the pool of workers three years after having started working with a firm will
contain workers who got this permanent contract, and another set that will be
essentially in the same situation as before the three years (they still can get a
contract covered by a fixed-term contract, see Bover and Gomez (2004), who
document that the main way out of unemployment is a fixed-term contract).
Our methods use such time discontinuity in the pool of workers to examine the
impact on living arrangements.
Two reasons lead us not to use actual time spent in the firm as our “running”
variable in the regression discontinuity design. First, focusing on “actual” time
spent with the firm may lead us to analyze the selected group of workers who
stay in a particular firm three years (those that the firm is specially interested
in). Second, the characteristics firms use to retain fixed-term workers may
be correlated with the propensity to establish a new household (higher-ability
workers with higher income prospects). Instead, we construct a new variable
called “potential tenure”. The variable keeps track of the time elapsed since a
contract was first signed with a firm, regardless of whether or not the worker
keeps on working with the same firm. To reinforce our argument, three years
after signing a temporary contract, the worker has a chance of experiencing a
decrease in the probability of losing his or her job. Our strategy only exploits
exposure to the option associated to the time limit, but not the actual take-up
of the option of getting a high firing cost contract.
human capital may be one example of such costs.
8The incentive may not only be ability-related, there may be temporary shortages of a
specific type of human capital or skill level that leads firms to hire workers with a high firing
cost contract.
9
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We start by relating our variables of interest (whether or not the young adult
lives with parents and the type of contract he or she is covered by) to time spent
in the position. We use data on young adults (between 20 and 35 years of age)
to estimate the following model.
Yit = α0+α1TREATit+f(timeit)+g(timeit−3.25)∗TREATit+β1Xit+ε3 (1)
Yit denotes the two binary outcomes we are interested in: working with a
high firing cost contract and living with parents. The key variable is TREATit
,a dummy indicating whether or not more than three years have passed since a
worker started working in a firm. timeit denotes potential tenure (time elapsed
since the worker reports having signed a contract with a firm), and it is measured
in quarters. Ideally, one would like to know the number of days the worker has
been working with the firm. Unfortunately, the Spanish survey only asks about
the number of years spent in the job, if these exceed one. We thus add a random
variable taking four values to the reported ”time at a firm” the first time we
observe a worker, and then accumulate the number of quarters as we observe
the worker in subsequent waves of the survey we use (our sample is a rotating
panel of young workers followed at most for six quarters).9 The functions f(),
and g() are two flexible functions of potential tenure and capture any impact
of time on separate regressions having “working under a fixed-term contract”
and “living with parents” as dependent variables. We model f() and g() using
global polynomials of order two, but the results are not affected much when
we use a third order global polynomial.10 . Finally, Xit contains controls like
age, gender, schooling attainment, family size, industry and regional dummies,
included to reduce the standard errors of TREATit. The standard errors in all
specifications are clustered at the level of quarters elapsed since a fixed-term
9We follow Güell and Petrongolo (2007) in their measurement of tenure at the firm. We
are aware that our procedures introduce measurement error in our “running” variable. While
this version does not fully address the measurement error problem induced by our strategy,
we discuss the consequences of variables measured with error below.
10Given the coarseness of the running variable (number of quarters), we chose not to work
with local polynomial regressions, as Hahn, Todd Van der Klaauw (2001) suggest.
10
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 17 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 0737 
contract is signed. We follow most of the literature on regression discontinuity
design in estimating (1) using OLS - see Angrist and Lavy (1999) or Van der
Klaauw (2002).
The coefficient of interest is α1 in a specification that has “living with par-
ents” as a dependent variable. α1 is an intention-to-treat parameter that mea-
sures the impact of the discontinuity in the incentive to convert a contract into
permanent on the living arrangements of young adults. If exposure to the risk of
going into nonemployment does affect the probability that a young adult forms
a new household, the coefficient would be negative and significantly different
from zero.11
To examine more closely the dynamics of the household formation and con-
tract conversion, we also perform an analysis of changes. Namely, we use a
sample of young adults whom we observe living with parents and working cov-
ered by a fixed-term contract, and then examine the rate of leaving each of those
status. We estimate the following regressions:
∆permit = β0 + β1TREAT
1
it + f1(timeit)
+g1(timeit − 3.25) ∗ TREAT 1it + u1it (2)
new_hhit = γ0 + γ1TREAT
1
it + f2(timeit) +
+g2(timeit − 3.25) ∗ TREAT 1it + u2it (3)
∆permit is a binary variable that takes value 1 if young adult i has a per-
manent contract in quarter t but not in quarter t − 1. TREAT 1it is defined as
a dummy that takes value 1 in all the quarters between 3 and 4. TREAT 1it is
11A concern with this strategy is that the transition from a transitory contract into a
permanent one can be associated with wage increases (see De la Rica, 2003). Thus δ1 can
also pick up wage increases associated to contract changes. As wage increases are positively
related to household formation in virtually any paper on coresidence we are aware of, δ1 is
most likely to be an upper bound on the impact of a fall in employment risk on household
formation (see Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1994; Aasve et al., 2001, Haider and McGarry, 2005
or Martins and Villanueva, 2006 among others)
11
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again an intention-to-treat parameter that measures the impact of any event
that happens in the third year after a worker signs a fixed-term contract with
a firm. Strictly speaking, in model (2), we would only want the dummy that
takes value 1 in the first quarter after the third year, because this is when the
legal limit binds. Still, the pattern of reporting error we introduce in the data
leads us to allow an effect that lasts for four quarters. In model (3), we use a
variable that takes value 1 for four quarters to allow for some lags in the im-
pact of contract conversions on household formation, as the latter can be a slow
process. In all specifications, we work between years 1 and 4.75 in the life of a
fixed-term contract. In previous versions of the paper, we have experimented
using 5.5 and 7.25 as further limits, with qualitatively similar results.
The coefficient of interest is γ1, that measures the impact of any development
between 3 and 4 years after a fixed-term contract is signed on new household
formation (above and beyond of what a smooth function of time would predict).
γ1 would be positive if a contract with higher firing costs reduces employment
risk and young adults react to higher security by establishing a new household.
One concern about models (2) and (3) as that we use selected samples (we
discard young adults whom we do not observe living with their parents, who
are not working or who are covered by a permanent contract). This version
does not address the issue of initial sample selection, but we note that such
considerations will not bias our estimates as long as they are a smooth function
of time passed since signing a fixed-term contract.
2.2 Second methodology: regional variation in subsidies
to contract conversion
Our second strategy uses the regional variation in incentives to convert fixed-
term contracts into permanent ones documented in Section 2 as a source of
identification. Basically, we assume that the evolution over time of those sub-
sidies is uncorrelated with decisions of household formation for channels other
12
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than the conversion of a temporary contract into a permanent one.12 ,13
We focus the analysis on a sample of young adults in the Spanish Em-
ployment survey whom we observe living with their parents, working on a job
covered by a fixed-term contract. We measure the causal impact of a change of
contract from fixed-term into permanent, using the following bivariate probit of
the probability of forming a new household as a function of the contract type.
new_hhit = 1[δ0 + δ1∆permit + βXit + ε1 > 0] (2)
∆permit = 1[γ0 + γ2subsidy + γ1Xit + ε2 > 0] (3)
new_hhit is a binary variable that takes a value of 1 if we observe the young
adult establishing a new household in that quarter and 0 otherwise. ∆permit is
a binary variable that takes a value of 1 if we observe the individual’s contract
changing from temporary into permanent, and zero otherwise. Note that it
is rather unlikely to find an instantaneous impact of contract conversion on
household formation, as there are likely lags associated to, for example, finding
appropriate accommodation. Thus, we set ∆permit to 1 in any observation
following the conversion of a fixed-term contract into a permanent one.
Xit contains the age of the young adult, family size in the original household,
year dummies and the regional unemployment rate when we observe the indi-
vidual and the regional unemployment rate when the subsidies were introduced.
Xit also includes the regional quality-unadjusted price of housing.
The key variable identifying the system of equation is subsidy, that measures
the economic incentive a firm in a given region faces to upgrade a contract from
fixed-term into permanent and is measured in thousands of 1995 euro. Note that
we do not observe whether the firm for which the young adult works actually got
12As mentioned above, the introduction of those subsidies coincided with a major, national-
wide reform that diminished firing costs for workers who were employed under a permanent
contract. To avoid problems with the increase in employment risk among workers with per-
manent contracts, we have chosen to focus the analysis on the post national-wide reform.
13Large regions like Catalonia and Madrid decided not to implement those subsidies in 1998.
Poorer regions were indeed more likely to adopt those subsidies. There is some concern about
the endogeneity of adoption, that we try to address below.
13
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the subsidy, and use only variation in subsidy that is presented in Table A.1.
ε1, ε2 are random disturbances, distributed as a bivariate normal with mean
zero.
The parameter of interest in this specification is β2, that measures the causal
impact of a decrease in the probability of losing the job on the propensity to
establish a new household. The system of equations (1) and (2) is identified by
the joint normality of the error terms and by the assumption that the regional
amount of the subsidy only affects the probability that a young adult forms a
new household through its impact on the propensity of the firm to sign a new
contract.
The “average treatment effect” can be defined as Φ(cxβ1) − Φ(cxβ0). wherecxβ1( cxβ0) is the linear prediction setting ∆permit to 1 (0). Finally, to assess the
impact of functional form assumptions on our estimates, we also report TSLS
estimates, assuming linear probability models for both events (forming a new
household and obtaining a high firing cost contract.
3 Data
We use the 1987-2001 waves of the Spanish Labor Force Survey (Encuesta de
Población Activa or EPA). The EPA is a rotating panel in which individuals are
tracked for up to six periods (aside from attrition issues). The EPA contains
basic information about the labor history of the individual, as well as about
age, occupation, industry and schooling.
First, we need to define the variables “establishing a new household” and
“conversion of a temporary contract into a permanent one”. In principle, the
second variable is easy to construct as long as we can keep track of changes in
the type of contract a worker has in different moments of time. Unfortunately,
the event “establishing a new household” is harder to measure, as the EPA does
not track young individuals who leave households in the interview to establish
a new one. We follow Martins and Villanueva (2006) and define that a young
adult has left the sample if, conditional on the original parental household being
14
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in the sample in quarters q and q+1, we observe the young adult as a household
member in period q but not in period q+1.14 Below, we compare our measure to
rates of household formation among young adults obtained using panels that do
track individuals as they leave their original household. Our sample is restricted
to young individuals who are between 20 and 35 years of age and who are
working. We exclude young adults who are unemployed in the first quarter we
observe them, as we assume they are not exposed to the risk of losing their job.
3.1 Sample used for the first strategy, exploiting legal
time limits
The sample for this strategy spans the periods 1987 and 1995. For this sample,
we construct the variable “potential tenure”. The methodology is the following.
We accumulate potential experience using the first observation on actual tenure
in the present firm we observe. Every quarter, we add .25 to our measure,
regardless of the situation of the young adult in the labor market. A problem
with the potential tenure measure is that the Spanish Employment Survey does
not contain monthly-level information on tenure, but only on years. We use
the strategy in Güell and Petrongolo (2007) who draw random realizations from
an uniform distribution with discrete support to assign in which quarter we
first observe an individual, and then accumulate potential tenure in consecutive
quarters.
Of course, by construction, our measures of “actual" and “potential" tenure
will coincide if the individual stays with the same firm. Otherwise, actual tenure
14Linking individuals and households over time is not an obvious task. The Spanish Statis-
tical Agency provides two versions of EPA. The first is a series of cross-sections with detailed
individual and family information, but in which all identifiers that would allow tracking an
individual over time are scrapped before releasing the data. The second is a longitudinal file
in which the information that allows tracking an individual over time is released, but all the
identifiers that identify the houshold the individual belongs to are scrapped before releasing
the data. Thus, to construct measures of household formation in the longitudinal version of
the EPA one needs to identify the household an observation belongs to. We have benefitted
from the invaluable help of Ildefonso Mendez, who has developed a software (using strictly
public information) that allows identifying individuals belonging to the same household. We
have done some coarse checks to ensure that our matching make sense, like cross-checking
the number of families reported by our matching and those in the cross-section version of the
EPA, and checking if the number of household members provided by our measure is not larger
than the number of family members reported by the EPA.
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will always fall below potential tenure. We use two samples, whose summary
statistics are reported in Table 1.
3.2 Sample used for the second strategy, using regional
variation in subsidies to conversion
The second sample is described in Table 2. A key variable in this second strat-
egy is the amount of the subsidy that a firm qualifies for after converting a
transitory contract into a permanent one (we ignore much higher subsidies be-
cause of contracting an unemployed as a permanent worker). Table 2 presents
summary statistics of subsidies, quarterly rates of contract conversion (from
fixed-term into permanent) and quarterly rates of household formation. The
rates of household formation range between 1.4 percent and 2.8 percent per
quarter. The yearly rate of household formation for the same period estimated
in Martins and Villanueva (2006) using the European Community Household
Panel is 8 percent. Regions with a higher fraction of permanent contracts tended
to have lower subsidies (see the case of Catalonia, Madrid or Baleares). Thus,
in all our specifications, we control for regional unemployment rate prior to the
passing of the laws establishing subsidies.
4 Results
Table 3 presents OLS regressions of the event “establishing a new household”
on the variable “the contract changes from transitory into permanent”, holding
constant the age, region, gender, year and regional housing price. The coefficient
of ”contract changed into permanent” in model 1 is .0057 and implies that once
a young worker living in a two-person family and between 25 and 29 years
of age obtains a permanent contract, his or her chances of establishing a new
household in the following quarters increase from 2.2 percent to 2.77 percent.
The coefficient drops a bit once we control for provincial dummies. Models 3 and
4 distinguish between the events “contract upgraded in this quarter”, “contract
upgraded last quarter” and “contract upgraded two quarters ago”. The pattern
of results suggest that most of the statistical association between both variables
16
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happens in the quarter of contract conversion and the next one. As mentioned
above, the results in Table 3 cannot readily be interpreted as a causal impact
of employment risk on household formation, given a number of confounding
factors: local labor markets or unobserved variation in young adult’s maturity.
4.1 Results using legal limits to conversion
We start by illustrating our empirical methods in Graphs 2 and 3. Our identi-
fication strategy amounts to examining if the degree of “bunching” in contract
upgrades (from fixed-term into permanent) at three years after a labor rela-
tionship is started is mirrored by a discontinuous change in the patterns of
household formation observed. Graph 2 displays the time pattern of contract
upgrades since the moment a labor contract starts with a firm, estimated using
a second-order global polynomial in time and a dummy indicating whether or
not more than 3.25 years elapsed since signing a contract. The time window
used to estimate the model is between 1 and 4.5 years after signing a contract.
Perhaps due to accumulation of experience in the labor market, firm’s learning
about the ability of the worker, or due to a speedier rate of arrival of job offers
as experience is accumulated in the labor market, the time profile of contract
conversion is positive both before and after the three year limit. Still, we detect
a 4 percent jump in the fraction of contract conversions at the three-year limit.
The jump is clearly out of the 95 confidence bands of the predictions at either
side of the discontinuity. Graph 3 displays exactly the same predicted values for
regressions where the dependent variable is whether or not the young adult lives
with parents. Either at the 3-year limit or in the quarters immediately after, we
fail to detect a drop in the fraction of young adults who live with their parents.
The visual evidence in Graphs 2 and 3 provide little evidence for a causal link
between the type of contract and the household formation by young adults.
Table 4, Panel A shows selected estimates of the coefficients of model (1),
with the dependent variable being the type of contract (1 if permanent, 0 if fixed-
term).15 The coefficient of interest is the intervention dummy d(time ≥ .25),
15The standard errors are clustered at each level of year elapsed since contract was first
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indicating whether or not more than three years have passed since the contract
was signed. The magnitude of the estimate in Model 1 of Table 4 is .0429.
That means an estimated “jump” of contract conversions of 4.29 percentage
points at the legal limit of three years. The 4.3 percentage points “jump”
in contract conversions is relatively stable across specifications: see Models 2-
4. Table 4, Panel B shows the coefficients of the intervention dummy on a
regression with the dependent variable being “the young adult lives with his or
her parents”, and otherwise identical to that shown above. For all sample splits,
the estimated coefficients are small, positive and statistically not different from
zero (a positive estimate would imply that the fraction of young adults living
with parents increases following an increase in job stability). Thus, we fail to
detect a change in the living arrangements of young adults around the time of
mandatory contract conversion.
Next, we explore more closely the dynamics of contract conversion and new
household formation exploiting the panel aspect of the Spanish employment sur-
vey. That is, we focus on individual changes in contract conversion and changes
in living arrangements. Focusing on individual changes is helpful because we
are dealing with low probability events, and detecting changes in stocks may
be difficult. To detect in a simple way if there is a change in either contract
conversion or in living arrangements at any particular time after signing a fixed
term contract, we fit a second-order global time polynomial in time elapsed
since signing a contract to each of the variables of interest: contract conversion
and formation of a new household through youth emancipation. We plot the
residuals of each of those regressions averaged by quarter elapsed since the con-
tract started in Graph 4. The full line in Graph 4 connects the residuals from
the contract conversion equation, and the dotted line those of the household
signed with the firm (see Card and Lee, 2006). Additional covariates (not shown), are year
dummies (1990 omitted), a dummy for whether the young adult is between 20 and 24 years of
age and another dummy for 25-29 years of age, 1-digit industry dummies, three dummies of
educational attainment (”does not read”, ”primary school” and ”professional training”) and
region dummies (Andalusia is omitted). Note that we do not control for covariates like family
size in this specification due to its mechanical correlation with the dependent variable “the
child lives with parents”.
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formation equation. While the series are very close to each other up to the
year 1.75 (i.e., quarter 7 after contract conversion), the residuals of the contract
change equation become positive and rather stretched between 3 and 4 years
after signing the FTC, suggesting that there is some event at year 3 that leads
to more conversions. We identify such event with mandatory conversions at the
third year. Conversely, the series of residuals of new household formation do not
exhibit such stretching at three years. If anything, household formation seems
to lead contract conversion, a finding that we discuss below.
Tables 5 and 6 show the estimates of equations (2) and (3). For two reasons,
we choose to work with an intervention variable that lasts for four quarters,
instead of one. The first reason is that new household formation is possibly
a time-consuming process (it may involve the purchase of a durable good, like
housing), and there is little reason to expect that an instantaneous impact that
just operates during the same quarter when the contract conversion happens (the
evidence in Table 3 suggests statistical association between contract conversion
and new household formation for two quarters). Second, and due to the type
of information in the Spanish employment survey, there is some measurement
error in the timing of the conversion of the fixed-term contract. Thus, we
allow the intervention variable in both specifications to take up to 4 quarters.16
Finally, instead of dropping observations in which a young worker has had his
or her contract upgraded into permanent in the past, we still maintain those
observations in the sample with a value of the dependent variable in the contract
conversion regression of 1. One reason for doing this is to allow the construction
of simple Wald estimates of the impact of contract change on the chances of
forming a new household by taking ratios of the impact of our intervention
dummy (that spans for four quarters) on contract conversion (young workers
with a new contract stay around 2-3 quarters in our sample) and the impact of
16The results are somewhat sensitive (in terms of precission) when we specify two or three
quarters after the third year). We think that the randomization of the number of quarters
biases the results against finding bunching at exactly 3 years in contract conversions, Due to
lags in household formation, we find it less plausible that the measurement error in our inter-
vention dummy obscures the coefficient of in the specification with new household formation
as a dependent variable.
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the intervention dummy on new household formation.
Table 5 presents OLS estimates of equation (1), assuming that f() and g()
are quadratic functions. In all cases, the dummy indicating that between 3 and
4 years have elapsed after signing the contract is large and positive: conversion
rates increase by between 3 and 5 percentage points during such period. The
estimates are significantly different from zero for usual confidence levels. Fur-
thermore, F-tests indicating the validity of the instrument are well above the
threshold in Murray (2005). Table 6 presents OLS estimates of the link between
household formation and the intervention dummy. The coefficient has even the
wrong sign (contract conversion impacts negatively household formation), but
the precision in our preferred sample (males, 25-35 years of age) is small.
4.2 Regional variation in subsidies to convert temporary
contracts into permanent ones
Next, we turn to an alternative source of identification: the incidence of regional
subsidies to contract conversion between 1998 and 2001. The reason for this
alternative strategy is to reassure ourselves that the lack of an impact of contract
conversion on household formation is not due to pitfalls in our dataset of in our
identification strategy.
We start by examining whether regional differences in the subsidies different
regions announce explain regional differences in patterns of household formation.
Table 7 presents Probit and OLS regressions in which the dependent variable
takes value 1 if the temporary contract is observed changing into a permanent
one, and can be considered as the “first stage regression”, that tests the validity
of the instrument (amount of the subsidy) in explaining contract conversions.17
As before, we experiment with different subsamples. The first contains all young
adults whom we first observe living with their parents and with a temporary
contract, and are between 20 and 35 years of age. The second subsample focuses
on young adults between 25 and 35 years. Finally, we split the sample by gender.
17The specification in this strategy focuses on “flows” (individual changes in the type of
contract or living arrangements), as we did not get convincing evidence that subsidies changed
the stock of young adults with permanent contracts.
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All regressions include controls for age, gender, region, industry, occupation and
schooling, as well as some parental characteristics, like their schooling, parental
household size and labor market status, the regional housing price. Finally, we
introduce regional controls, like the unemployment rate at the introduction of
the subsidy (to partly mitigate the problem of the endogeneity of the decision
to implement the subsidy) and the current unemployment rate (to control for
current labor market status). Standard errors are computed assuming arbitrary
correlation among observations belonging to the same individual, as well as
independence and heteroscedasticity.18
The coefficients in Table 7 reflect the marginal change in the probability
of conversion when one changes the variable of interest by a unit, holding the
rest of the covariates constant. In all models, but in females between 20 and
35 years of age, larger subsidies result in higher conversion rates. The F-test
of exclusion of the subsidy variable varies across specifications, and denotes a
strong instrument in the main specification —it is 16.22, above the benchmark
values reported in Murray (2005). As subsidies in the region can be correlated
with other characteristics that affect both contract conversion and the labor
market performance of young adults, we examine whether subsidies explain
pre-1998 conversions in Table A.2. The coefficients of the variable subsidy
reported in Table A.2 are positive, much smaller than those in Table 7, and not
significantly different from zero.
Table 8 presents estimates of the link between contract conversion and house-
hold formation using two alternative specifications: Two Stage Least Squares
and Bivariate Probits. The estimates are in some instances negative, imprecise
and not significantly different from zero. Table 7, Panel B reports the coefficients
of the link between contract conversion and new household formation using a
bivariate Probit. The results for the baseline sample suggest that conversion of
a temporary contract into a permanent one increases the probability of forming
a new household by .2 percentage points (the probability of emancipation in our
18We also followed Bertrand, Mullainathan and Duflo (2004) clustering standard errors by
incidence groups of the subsidy, but the standard errors were implausibly small.
21
BANCO DE ESPAÑA      28 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 0737 
sample is of 2.2 percentage points). Unfortunately standard errors are relatively
large. Given this, we also computed intention-to-treat models (i.e., models that
regress directly household formation on the subsidy). The coefficient of the
variable “subsidy” are typically small: an increase in the subsidy of 1,000 euro
increases the probability of household formation by .001.Overall, we infer that
the type of contract does not seem to have an important causal impact on the
living arrangements of the youth.
4.3 Potential explanations
We briefly consider what may underlie the lack of a causal impact of cost-of-
firing on the decision to establish a new household among young adults. First,
we examine the hypothesis that young adults whose job is covered by a fixed-
term contracts do not perceive high chances to go to unemployment. Second,
we consider whether or not there are differences in routes of household forma-
tion by type of contract. The evidence comes from the 1994-2001 waves of the
European Community Household Panel, a survey much more comprehensive
than the Spanish Employment Survey. The information in the survey does not
permit us to construct our key instruments (the 3-year rule was not binding
between 1994-2001, and we lack information on region to construct the vari-
able “subsidy"). Therefore, the evidence presented in this subsection is mainly
suggestive.
An explanation of the lack of an effect of contract type on living arrange-
ments is young adults may anticipate that their labor market status is bound
to change in a year’s time, say, and that, while they hold nominally a fixed-
term contract temporarily, the chances of losing the job are weak. While such
a hypothesis is at odds with the data in the Spanish Employment Survey, we
know little about how individuals process information and form their expecta-
tions about future events (see Manski and Straub, 2000). We use data from
the 1994-2001 European Household Panel to examine the evolution of subjec-
tive satisfaction with job security around contract conversion. The European
Community asks workers about their level of satisfaction with the security on
22
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their job. The answer is a 0 to 10 variable.19 Graph 5 plots the time profile
of one-year differences in the perception of job insecurity. The x-axis contains
the time to contract conversion, and the y-axis the average of the individual
level of satisfaction with job insecurity minus the satisfaction last year. Graph
5 suggests an important increase at the time of contract conversion. Workers
seem to feel more certain about their jobs when these are permanent, rather
than fixed-term.
Table 9 provides additional evidence about the link between low-firing costs
contracts and household formation on one hand and the type of housing demand
on the other. It uses data from the European Community Household Panel, a
survey that tracks young adults as they form their own household. The first
column in Table 9 shows the rate of household formation among young workers
in four European countries where fixed-term contracts are widespread; Spain,
Italy, France and Portugal. The first column of Panel A in Table 9 documents
household formation rates by type of contract. The second through fourth
columns in Table 9 show the fraction of young adults who establish a new
household distinguishing by three routes of tenure: owner, renter and rent-
free accommodation. As in the Spanish Employment survey (see Table 3), we
find differences of rates of household formation across workers with different
contract types (.077 per year among workers covered by a fixed-term contract,
compared to .0649 among workers covered with a permanent contract). The
corresponding columns in Panels B through D display a contract-related gap in
household formation in Portugal (Panel D, .068 for permanent contracts vs. .059
for fixed-term contracts), but the gap disappears in Italy (both set of workers
have virtually the same rate of new household formation: .066) and the gap is
even reversed in France. Thus, the link between contract type and the rate of
household formation is not prevalent across European countries.
Second, we interpret from columns (2)-(4) of Table 9 that what fixed-term
19Subjective measures like satisfaction are likely to capture cross-sectional differences in
perception of risks as well as individual variation in the perceptions of what is a “satisfactory
level” of job security (that may mean different things for different workers). To alleviate the
problem, we work with individual one-year differences in satisfaction.
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contracts shape is not the rate of household formation, but the type of tenure
arrangement in the first accommodation. The fraction of young workers covered
by a high-firing cost contract who form a new household and own their accom-
modation is 69% (Table 9, Panel A, column 2 row 1), while 20% rent the house
they move to (Table 9, Panel A, column 3, row 1). Conversely, among young
workers who form a household and are covered by a fixed-term contract, the
probability of owning is 16 percentage points smaller than among those covered
by a high-firing cost contract: 53% (Table 9, Panel A, column 2 row 2). Young
workers covered by a fixed-term contract who form a new household are 12 per-
centage points more likely to rent a new accommodation than those covered
by a high-firing cost contract (32% of workers with a fixed term contract rent,
instead of 20% with a permanent contract). Qualitatively similar results are
present in the rest of the countries: young workers with a permanent contract
are more likely to become home-owners and less likely to become renters than
young workers with a fixed-term contract. Another tentative finding is that, in
all countries, fixed-term contracts are less likely to become home owners paying
a mortgage loan than young workers with a permanent contract. An interpre-
tation of that finding is that the impact of firing costs on tenure arrangements
may not work through postponement of hard-to-reverse decisions due to risk
aversion, but to difficulties in accessing credit markets.
Overall, our interpretation of the evidence in Table 9 is that young adults
react to the presence of employment risk by choosing routes of household for-
mation that involve a lower adjustment costs in the case of an income drop.
Renting involves small adjustment costs in face of an income downturn; in Spain
the renter in the can break the contract at any time, just with one month’s no-
tice. Alternatively, selling a house in the event of an income downturn may be a
costly process. Martins and Villanueva (2006) provide evidence consistent with
the idea that sharp changes in the cost of owner-occupied housing do affect the
living arrangements of the youth.
24
BANCO DE ESPAÑA       31 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 0737 
5 Conclusions
This study exploits two institutional features of the Spanish labor market to
address the question: Does the growing incidence of employment insecurity
among young adults account for their recent patterns of household formation?
The advantage of working with Spanish labor market data is the widespread use
of low-firing cost contracts, that allows us to identify which young adults are
exposed to the risk of losing their job. We can also exploit legal changes that
influence the labor demand of firms for workers with different contract types
to obtain arguably exogenous variation in employment insecurity. Thus, we are
able to estimate the link between obtaining a more secure jobs and the decision
to establish a new household controlling for other confounding factors.
We use two strategies to identify the causal link between job insecurity and
household formation. The first strategy exploits a legal limit between 1987
and 1994 that required firms to convert temporary jobs into permanent ones
after three years of continuous relationship between a worker and a firm. That
legal limit creates a discontinuity in the chances of obtaining a more secure
job three years after signing a contract, that we use to identify the impact
of changes in firing costs on household formation. The second strategy uses
temporal and regional variation in subsidies to convert low-firing cost contracts
into high firing costs ones between 1998 and 2001. Each strategy identifies the
impact using a different group of the population and a different time period, but
both consistently lead to the same conclusion; the link between job insecurity
and household formation is at best weak.
We would like to flag two lines of research. The first is to embark in a full-
fledged study of the impact of changes in the risk of losing the job in the decision
to form a household by owning a house or by renting one. The second is to
examine the impact of employment risk on outcomes like household consumption
or portfolio composition.
25
BANCO DE ESPAÑA      32 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 0737 
REFERENCES 
 
AASVE, A., S. BURGESS, A. CHESHER and C. PROPPER (2002). ''Transition from 
Home to Marriage of Young Americans'', Journal of Applied Econometrics, 17, pp. 1-
23. 
 
ANGRIST, J. D., and V. LAVY (1999). ''Using Maimonides' rule to Estimate the Effect of 
Class Size on Scholastic Achievement'', The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 114, 
No. 2, pp. 533-575. 
 
BECKER, S., S. BENTOLILA, A. FERNANDES and A. ICHINO (2007a). Income 
Insecurity and Youth Emancipation: A Theoretical Approach, mimeo, University of 
Bern. 
 
––  (2007b). Youth Emancipation and Perceived Job Insecurity of Parents and Children, 
mimeo, University of Bern. 
 
BILLARI, F., D. PHILIPOV and P. BAIZÁN (2001). ''Leaving Home in Europe: The 
Experience of Cohorts Born Around 1960'', International Journal of Population 
Geography, 7, pp. 339-356. 
 
BOVER, O., and R. GÓMEZ (2004). ''Another Look at Unemployment Duration: Exit to a 
Permanent vs a Temporary Job'', Investigaciones Económicas, vol. XXVIII (2), 2004, 
pp. 285-314. 
 
DOLADO, J., J. JIMENO and C. GARCÍA-SERRANO (2002). ''Drawing Lessons from the 
Boom of Temporary Jobs in Spain'', Economic Journal, 112 (480), pp. F270-F295. 
 
GARCÍA, J. I., and Y. REBOLLO (2007). The Use of Permanent Contract Across Spanish 
Regions: Do Regional Wage Subsidies Work, Working Paper No. 0706, Universidad 
Pablo de Olavide. 
 
GIULIANO, P. (2007). ''Living Arrangements in Western Europe. Does Cultural Origin 
Matter?'', Journal of the European Economic Association. 
 
GÜELL, M., and B. PETRONGOLO (2007). ''How Binding Are Legal Limits? Transitions 
from Temporary to Permanent Work in Spain'', Labour Economics, Vol, 14 (2), pp. 
153-183. 
 
GUTIÉRREZ-DOMÉNECH, M. (2002). ''The Impact of the Labour Market on the Timing 
of Marriage and Births in Spain'', CEP Discussion Paper Centre for Economic 
Performance, LSE CEPDP0556. 
 
HAHN, J., P. TODD and W. VAN DER KLAAUW (2001).''Identification and Estimation 
of Treatment Effects with a Regression Discontinuity Design'', Econometrica, Vol. 69, 
No. 1, January, pp. 201-209. 
 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA      33 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 0737 
HAIDER S., and MCGARRY (2005). Recent Trends in Resource Sharing Among the Poor, 
NBER Working Paper No. 11612. 
 
KUGLER A., J. F. JIMENO and V. HERNANZ (2002). Employment Consequences of 
Restrictive Permanent Contracts: Evidence From Spanish Labor Market Reforms, 
Economic Working Papers No. 651, Department of Economics and Business, 
Universitat Pompeu Fabra. 
 
MANACORDA, M., and E. MORETTI (2006). ''Why Do Most Italian Young Men Live 
With Their Parents? Intergenerational Transfers and Household Structure'', Journal of 
the European Economic Association. 
 
MANSKI, C., and J. STRAUB (2000). ''Workers Perception of Job Insecurity in the mid-
1990s: Evidence from the Survey of Economic Expectations'', Journal of Human 
Resources, Vol. 5 (3), pp. 447-479. 
 
MARTÍNEZ-GRANADO, M., and J. RUIZ-CASTILLO (2002). ''The Decisions of Spanish 
Youth: A Cross-Section Study'', Journal of Population Economics, Vol. 15 (2), pp. 305-
330. 
 
MARTINS N., and E. VILLANUEVA (2006). Does Limited Acces to Mortgage Debt 
Explain Why Young Adults Live With Their Parents?, Working Paper No. 628, Bank of 
Spain. 
 
MURRAY M. (2005). The Bad, The Weak and The Ugly: Avoiding The Perils of 
Instrumental Variable Estimation, manuscript Bates College. 
 
DE LA RICA, S. (2003). ''Wage Differentials Between Permanent and Temporal Contracts: 
Further Evidence'', DFAEII Working Papers 200207, Universidad del País Vasco- 
Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico II. 
 
DE LA RICA, S., and A. IZA (2004). Career planning in Spain: Do fixed-term contracts 
delay marriage and parenthood?, DFAEII Working Paper 200305, Departamento de 
Fundamentos del Análisis Económico II, Universidad del País Vasco. 
 
ROSENZWEIG, M. R., and K. I. WOLPIN (1994). ''Parental and Public Transfers to 
Young Women and Their Children'', The American Economic Review, Vol. 84, No. 5, 
December, pp. 1195-1212. 
 
TOPEL, R. H. (1986). ''Local Labor Markets'', The Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 94, 
No. 3, Part 2: Hoover Institution Labor Conference, pp. S111- S143. 
 
VAN DER KLAAUW, W. (2002). ''Estimating the Effect of Financial Aid Offers on  
College enrollment: A Regression-Discontinuity Approach'', International Economic 
Review, Vol. 43 (4), November, pp. 1249-1287. 
 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA       34 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 0737 
Table 1: Summary statistics of sample used to analyze the impact of legal time limits.
Panel A: Young coresidents first observed working with a FT contract
Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum
Contract changed from temporary
into permanent 0.022 0.147 0 1
Young adult formed a new household 0.049 0.217 0 1
Age 22.67 3.382 20 35
Potential tenure (in years) 1.51 1.614 0 21.25
Actual tenure (in years) 0.997 1.487 0 20
Male 0.63 0.483 0 1
Household size in parental hhold. 4.328 1.291 2 13
Sample size: 244,253
Panel B: Young adults whom we observe working in some period
Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum
Job covered by permanent contract 0.517 0.500 0 1
Adult lives with parents 0.603 0.489 0 1
Age 25.058 4.209 20 35
Potential tenure (in years) 3.39 4.312 0 22
Actual tenure (in years) 3.28 4.33 0 20
Male 0.62 0.485 0 1
Household size in parental hhold. 3.391 1.507 1 13
Sample size: 633,621
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Table 2: Sample used for analysis of the impact of subsidies: 1998-2001
Contract changed from New household Permanent contract
Subsidy transitory to permanent formed (1 if permanent, 0 ow.) Lives with parents
1. Andalucia 1057.22 0.020 0.028 0.355 0.558
2. Aragon 389.25 0.038 0.022 0.499 0.519
3. Asturias 768.38 0.018 0.022 0.474 0.603
4. Baleares 0 0.041 0.028 0.527 0.470
5. Canarias 477.8 0.035 0.023 0.442 0.558
6. Cantabria 732.05 0.017 0.014 0.474 0.659
7. Castilla-Leon 1216.01 0.031 0.025 0.470 0.555
8. Castilla-La Mancha 0 0.031 0.024 0.419 0.542
9. Catalonia 0 0.042 0.024 0.512 0.534
10. Valencia 1289.64 0.034 0.022 0.443 0.519
11. Extremadura 2222.25 0.028 0.027 0.431 0.509
12. Galicia 477.47 0.023 0.022 0.425 0.622
13. Madrid 0 0.04 0.015 0.618 0.601
14. Murcia 1633.22 0.035 0.026 0.409 0.554
15. Navarra 831.51 0.045 0.023 0.506 0.585
16. Basque country 1661.96 0.033 0.022 0.440 0.605
17. Rioja 2681 0.037 0.017 0.506 0.55
Source: Own computations from the 1998-2001 waves of the Encuesta de la Población Activa
1. The first three columns present summary statistics on a sample of working young adults between 20 and 35 years of age, years 1991-1997.
whom we first observe living with a parent and working on a job regulated by a temporary contract. 
2. Subsidy amounts (in 1995 euros) indicate the amount that the group the young belongs to may qualify for. They do not reflect actual take-up
3. Last two columns correspond to a sample of working young adults between 20 and 35 years of age.
Sample (1), flows Sample (2), stocks
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Dependent variable takes value one if young adult leaves the house of parents, zero otherwise. Estimation method: OLS
Model I Model II Model III
Change from fixed-term to permanent .0057 .0051 --
(.0011) (.0010)
Contract changed in the present quarter -- -- .0104
(.0016)
Contract changed last quarter -- -- .0074
(.002)
Contract changed two quarters ago -- -- .0011
(.0018)
Age between 20 and 25 years -.0129 -.0128 -.012
(.0008) (.0008) (.0008)
Age between 31 and 35 years -.0063 -0.006 -.0062
(.00012) (.0012) (.0012)
Female .0033 .00339 .0033
(.0008) (.0008) (.0008)
Family size equals 3 .0047 .0046 .0047
(.0016) (.0016) (.0016)
Family size equals 4 .0047 .0047 .0047
(.0015) (.0015) (.0016)
Family size equals 5 .0089 .0088 .0088
(.0016) (.0016) (.0016)
Family size equals 6 or more .0093 .009 .0092
(.0017) (.0017) (.0017)
Constant .022 .012 .0218
(.0024) (.003) (.002)
Year dummies YES YES YES
Province dummies? NO YES NO
Observations 198,310 198,310
Notes: 1987-1995 waves of the Spanish Employment Survey (Encuesta de Población Activa). Sample of individuals between 18 and 35  
of age observed living with their parents and with a temporary contract. Education, industry and region included in Models 1 and 2.
2. Constant is an estimate of the probability of forming a new household of a young adult between 25 and 29 years, who has completed at 
least high school, lives in a family of 2 persons, works with a temporary contract in the food industry in Andalusia
Table 3. Changes in type of contract and household formation.
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Table 4. The impact of legal time limits on type of contract
Estimation method: OLS
Sample, by age and gender: 20-35 25-35 25-35 females 25-35 males
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable takes value 1 if young adult works under a permanent contract, 0 otherwise
d(3<years since FTC) .0429 .043 .043 .0426
(.011)** (.012)** (.015)** (.021)**
Female -.037 -.040
(.004) (.004)
Years since FTC .64 .616 .846 .47
(.131) (.082) (.113) (.16)
Years since FTC, squared -.165 -.16 -.288 -.082
(.067) (.043) (.057) (.079)
Years since FTC, cubed .0182 .0178 .04 .005
(.011) (.007) (.009) (.013)
(Years since FTC -3)*d(3<years since FTC<4) -.123 -.122 -.244 -.051
(.065) (.067) (.087) (.11)
(Years since FTC -3) squared*d(3<years FTC<4) .163 .137 .151 .12
(.081) (.081) (.129) (.14)
(Years since FTC -3) cubed*d(3<years FTC<4) -.086 -.077 -.132 -.044
(.029) (.030) (.053) (051)
Sample size 171148 111111 39543 71568
test F d=0 16.38 12.84 12.84 4.12
d(3<years since FTC) .000 .003 .0051 .0016
(.001) (.002) (.0049) (.007)
Female -.0108 -.0132
(.0016) (.0023)
Sample size 171148 111111 39543 71568
1. d(exp>3) is a binary variable that takes value1 if more than three years have passed since a temporary contract was signed
2. Window used: between 1 and 4.5 years of time since fixed-term contract signed 
3 Standard errors clustered at the level of years elapsed since a fixed-term contract was signed (in quarters). 
4. Covariates included in all specifications but not shown: age dummies, industry, and schooling
Panel B: Dependent variable: Young adult lives with his or her parents
5. *, ** statistically significant at 5%(1%) confidence level
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Estimation method: OLS
Dependent variable takes value 1 if temporary contract upgraded into permanent, 0 otherwise
20-35, all 25-35, all 25-35 females 25-35 males
(1) (2) (3) (4)
d(3<years since FTC<4) .0296 .0497 .0558 .0478
(.0041)** (.0088)** (.0115)** (.0105)**
Years since FTC -0.0361 -.0781 -0.12 -0.058
(.015)** (.0196) (.0308) (.0144)
Years since FTC, squared .0134 .0214 .0321 .0159
(.0028) (.0033) (.0052) (.0025)
(Years since FTC -3)*d(3<years since FTC<4) .0455 -.0065 -.17 .0937
(.0198) (.0296) (.025) (.064)
(Years since FTC -3) squared*d(3<years FTC<4) -.0236 .0218 .157 -.0641
(.0201) (.031) (.0274) (.0671)
Edad 20-24 -.0233 --
(.0058)
Edad 30-34 .0388 .0388 .041 .0375
(.0063) (.0058) (.009) (.011)
Female -.0063 -.0085
(.0027) (.0055)
test F d(3≥exp≤4)=0 52.12 31.90 25.92 20.72
Observations 64705 29458 10396 19062
1. d(3≥exp≤4) is a binary variable that takes value 1 if between 3 and 4 years have passed since the first time we observe a young adult
working under a fixed-term contract.
2. "Potential tenure" is the time elapsed since the first time we observe the individual working with a fixed-term contract
3. Standard errors allow for arbitrary correlation between observations belonging to the same individual and heteroscedasticity across individuals
5. Dependent variable: binary variable that takes value 1 if contract changed from temporary into permanent.
6. Additional covariates: region, gender, occupation, industry, schooling and year
4. *, ** statistically significant at 5%(1%) confidence level
Sample used, by gender and age
Table 5. The impact of legal limits on contract conversion 1987-1994
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Estimation method: OLS
Dependent variable takes value 1 if young adult forms a household in the quarter, 0 otherwise
Sample, by age and gender: 20-35 25-35 25-35 females 25-35 males
(1) (2) (3) (4)
d(3<years since FTC<4) -.004 -.0052 -.0076 -.0040
(.0012)** (.0019)** (.0032)** (.0028)
Years since FTC .021 0.0169 .0292 .0113
(.0039) -0.0044 (.0058) (.0049)
Years since FTC, squared -.0031 -.0019 -.004 -.0010
(.0009) (.0008) (.0014) (.0010)
(Years since FTC -3)*d(3<years since FTC<4) -.0017 -.0113 -.0118 -.0073
(0.013) (.012) (.0078) (.0214)
(Years since FTC -3) squared*d(3<years FTC<4) .0013 .0088 .0148 .0024
(.0135) (.012) (.0085) (.0212)
Edad 20-24 -.0145
(.0014)
Edad 30-34 -.0061 -.0052 -.0087 -.0027
(.0019) (.0019) (.0017) (.0025)
Female .006 .0059
(.0011) (.0012)
1. Standard errors clustered at the number of years since contract signed level.
2. *, ** statistically significant at 5%(1%) confidence level
3. Additional covariates: region, gender, occupation, industry, schooling and year
Table 6. The impact of legal limits on household formation.
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Table 7: The impact of regional subsidies on contract conversion (fixed-term into permanent)
Dependent variable takes value 1 if contract changes from fixed-term into permanent
Estimation method: OLS PROBIT OLS PROBIT OLS PROBIT
Sample by age and gender:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Subsidy amount .006 .005 .0057 .0045 .0079 .0066
(.0015)** (.0015)** (.0016)** (.0016)** (.0022)** (.0019)**
Male 0.0033 0.0039 0.0031 0.0044
(.0033) (.0032) (.0051) (.0048)
Current regional unempl. rate -0.0053 -0.0060 -0.0062 -0.0069 -0.0064 -0.0071
(0.0010)** (0.0009)** (0.0011)** (0.0010)** (0.0014)** (0.0012)**
1997 regional unempl. rate 0.0078 0.0075 0.0089 0.0080 0.0135 0.0130
(0.0027)** (0.0024)** (0.0038)* (0.0034)* (0.0027)** (0.0025)**
Age 0.0029 0.0028 -0.0006 -0.0007 -0.0012 -0.0013
(0.0005)** (0.0005)** -0.0008 -0.0008 -0.0011 -0.0010
Household size 0.0014 0.0014 0.0007 0.0007 -0.0003 -0.0003
-0.0007 -0.0008 -0.0013 -0.0014 -0.0016 -0.0018
Regional housing cost 0.0073 0.0049 0.0047 0.0028 0.0040 0.0030
-0.0040 -0.0037 -0.0045 -0.0041 -0.0065 -0.0061
Constant 0.0507 0.1765 0.1896
(0.0181)** (0.0315)** (0.0318)**
Sample size
R- squared 0.03 0.03 0.04
test subsidy=0 16.22 11.15 11.91 8.51 13.23 11.48
Pr. > dist 0.0001 0.0008 0.001 0.0035 0.0009 0.0007
20-25, all 25-35, all 25-35 males
186448 83567 50794
1. Standard errors allow for arbitrary correlation between observations belonging to the same individual and heteroscedasticity across individuals
2. *, ** statistically significant at 5%(1%) confidence level
3. Additional covariates: region, gender, occupation, industry, schooling and year
B
A
N
C
O
 D
E
 E
S
P
A
Ñ
A      41 
D
O
C
U
M
E
N
T
O
 D
E
 T
R
A
B
A
JO
 N
.º 0737 
Dependent variable takes value 1 if young adults forms a new household in the quarter, 0 otherwise
Sample, by age and gender: 20-25, all 25-35, all 25-35 males
Panel A: Model estimated by TSLS (only second stage shown)
Change fixed-term contract - permanent contract 0.0244 -0.0445 -0.0323
(.0513) (0.084) (0.0628)
Male -0.0019 -0.0021
(0.0009)* (.0013)
Current regional unempl. rate 0.0006 0.0003 0.0004
(0.0003)* (.0006) (.0004)
1997 regional unempl. rate -0.0005 0.0000 0.0013
(.0004) (.0011) (.0008)
Age 0.0008 -0.0002 -0.0003
(0.0002)** (.0002) (.0002)
Household size 0.0002 0.0001 0.0004
(.0002) (.0003) (.0003)
Regional housing cost -0.0016 -0.0010 0.0002
(0.0006)** (.0012) (.0009)
Panel B: Model estimated by bivariate probit (only coefficients of the outcome equation shown)
Change fixed-term contract - permanent contract -0.1133 -0.8681 -1.0039
(.2535) (0.2877)** (.5495)
Male -0.0452 -0.0327
(0.0225)* (.023)
Current regional unempl. rate 0.0159 0.0046 0.0040
(0.0036)** (.0061) (.0133)
1997 regional unempl. rate -0.0095 0.0016 0.0430
-0.0082 (.0242) (0.0173)*
Age 0.0204 -0.0050 -0.0076
(0.0029)** (.0038) (.0039)
Household size 0.0067 0.0030 0.0069
(.004) (.0047) (.0058)
Regional housing cost -0.0456 -0.0207 0.0059
(0.0143)** (.0217) (.0192)
Correlation unobservables in outcome and selection 0.5918 0.0344 0.4866
Sample size 186448 83567 50794
Table 8: The impact of contract conversion on household formation
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Table 9: Forms of household formation
Panel A: Household formation and tenure at first accomodation, by contract type (SPAIN)
New household New household, New household, Free-rent
All new households (owner)  (owner - borrower)  (renter) accomodation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Perm. contract .077 .692 .622 .206 .094
FT contract .065 .533 .393 .323 .131
Panel B: Household formation and tenure at first accomodation, by contract type (ITALY)
New household New household, New household, Free-rent
All new households (owner)  (owner - borrower)  (renter) accomodation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Perm. contract .066 .55 .23 .28 .15
FT contract .067 .48 .12 .32 .19
Panel C: Household formation and tenure at first accomodation, by contract type (FRANCE)
New household New household, New household, Free-rent
All new households (owner)  (owner - borrower)  (renter) accomodation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Perm. contract .110 .168 .155 .79 .04
FT contract .132 .10 .07 .808 .088
Panel D: Household formation and tenure at first accomodation, by contract type (PORTUGAL)
New household New household, New household, Free-rent
All new households (owner)  (owner - borrower)  (renter) accomodation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Perm. contract .068 .54 .41 .237 .222
FT contract .059 .507 .408 .25 .24
Own computations using the 1994-2001 Waves of the European Community Household Panel
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Table A.1: Subsidies for conversion of temporary  contracts into permanent ones, by region and year
Region / Year 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
1. Andalucia
2. Aragon
3. Asturias 2,100 euro 2,100 euro, all workers 2,100 euro, all workers 2,100 euro, all workers None
2,400 if "learning contract" 2,400 euro if "learning contract" 2,400 if "learning contract"
600 extra if female in male job 600 extra if female in male job plus 600 if female in male job
4. Baleares
5. Canarias None 3,600 if age<25 or if female None None None
6. Cantabria None 1,800 None None None
2,400 if age<30 or female
3,600 if above 40
7. Castilla-Leon None 1,800 euro 1,800 euro 1,803 if age<30 1,803 if age<30
2,400 if apprenticeship contract 2,400 if apprenticeship contract 2,040 if female
8. Castilla-La Mancha
9. Catalonia
10. Valencia None None 30% of payroll tax 30% of payroll tax 1400, practice contr.
1,800 if "practice c."
and female
11. Extremadura 4908 3545 3618 2100 if training 2101 if "practice c."
12. Galicia None 3000 euro if age<30 None None None
4200 if female in male job None None None
13. Madrid
14. Murcia 1800 2100 if age<=30 2100 if age<=30 2100 if age<=30 2100 if age<=30
2400 if age<30 1500 if age>30 1800 if age>30 1800 if age>30 1800 if age>30
15. Navarra None 1800 None Payroll subsidy depending on age
16. Basque country None 3000 for age<40 3000 for age<40
None 150 extra if female 150 extra if female
17. Rioja None Depends on # conversions Depends on # conversions
1. "Apprenticeship contract" (contrato de aprendizaje): contract typically offered to low-skilled young workers
2. "Learning contract" (contrato de formación): contract typically used for workers between 16 and 18 years of age. 
3. "Practice contract" (contrato en prácticas) Contract typically used for qualified young workers without labor market experience
All years, 1,800 euro if age < 30
All years, 1,200 euro for females
Depends on # conversions
Both years: Former+ 6009 euro if age<30
Former+ 4507 euro if age<30 & female
None
None
None
None
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Table A.2: Minimum amd maximum duration of temporary contracts, by contract type
minimum maximum minimum maximum minimum maximum minimum maximum
1. Contract 6 months 3 years 12 months 3 years 6 months 3 years
to promote employment
2. Practice contract 6 months 3 years 6 months 3 years 6 months 2 years 6 months 2 years
3. Apprenticeship contract 6 months 3 years 6 months 3 years 6 months 3 years 6 months 3 years
if age>16 & age<25 if age>16 & age<21
--- 
(contract disappeared)
1994 199719921984
B
A
N
C
O
 D
E
 E
S
P
A
Ñ
A       45 
D
O
C
U
M
E
N
T
O
 D
E
 T
R
A
B
A
JO
 N
.º 0737 
Table A.3. Do1998 subsidies explain pre-1998 contract upgrades?
Dependent variable takes value 1 if contract changed from fixed-term into permanent
Estimation method: OLS PROBIT
Subsidy 0.0009 0.0082
(0.0008) (0.0075)
Male -0.0014 -0.0097
(0.0023) (0.0189)
Current regional unempl. rate -0.0005 -0.0039
(0.0001)** (0.0009)**
1997 regional unempl. rate -2.2056 -22.0520
(0.3911)** (5.7145)**
Age 0.0015 0.0129
(0.0002)** (0.0021)**
Household size 0.0012 0.0109
(0.0006)* (0.0052)*
Regional housing cost 0.2543 2.5209
(0.04503)** (0.6577)**
# Young adults
Observations
51203
187768
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Graph 1a: The evolution of the fraction of young adults living with parents
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Graph 1b: Fraction of young workers covered by a fixed-term contract, by age.
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Graph 2: Fraction of youth with high firing cost contract
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Graph 3: Living arrangements since signing a FT contract
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Graph 4: Contract change and household formation, 1988-1995
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Graph 5: One-year change in satisfaction with job security
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